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Introduction 
 
 The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disability (CRPD)1 was passed 
by the General Assembly in 2006, and came into effect in May 2008.  As of December 2011, it had 
been signed by 153 countries and ratified by 108, in both cases including the United Kingdom.2  It is 
the first major human rights treaty of the twenty-first century.  Its impetus was that, whatever the 
intent of previous human rights treaties, people with disabilities have not shared equally in the 
rights created by those treaties;3 and the core of the CRPD is thus the re-articulation of rights found 
in other treaties in ways that will make those rights meaningful to people with disabilities.4  For all 
people with disabilities – people with mental disabilities5 certainly included - this has the potential 
for significant benefits.  Developed rights to non-discrimination in key areas, including employment, 
housing, education, health, standards of living and social, political and cultural participation, along 
with the right to be free from exploitation, violence and abuse, have the potential, if effectively 
implemented, to transform lives of persons with disabilities. 
 
 For people with mental disabilities, the CRPD represents an additional and highly significant 
change.  Previously, international regulation had assumed that control of this group was in some 
circumstances justified; the issue was determining the bounds of permitted compulsion.6  The CRPD 
                                                          
1
 UN General Assembly, A/61/611.  For full text, see http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150, 
accessed 15 January 2012. 
2
 See website of UN Enable, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=150, accessed 22 December 2011.  
As of that date, its optional protocol, which allows for individual complaints concerning alleged violations of 
the conventions, had been signed by 90 countries and ratified by 63, again including the United Kingdom. 
3
 See D. MacKay, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2006-7) 34 
Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 323-331. 
4
 There is dispute in the academic literature the degree to which the CRPD goes beyond this core function and 
creates new rights.  Thus Kayness and French note that the right to integrity contained in Article 17 has not 
been articulated in this way in the past, and Maigret notes that the right to be free from violence and abuse is 
not contained in other treaties.  On this issue generally, see G. Quinn, ‘Brining the UN Convention on rights for 
persons with disabilities to live in Ireland’, (2009) 37 British Journal of Learning Disabilities 245 at 247, P. 
Weller, ‘Supported Decision-Making and the Achievement of Non-Discrimination:  The Promise and Paradox of 
the Disabilities Convention’ in B. McSherry (ed), International Trends in Mental Health Law (Sydney:  
Federation Press, 2008) 85 at 89, R. Kayness, P. French, ‘Out of darkness into light?  Introducing the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 HRLRev 1 at 29, F. Mégret, ‘The Disabilities 
Convention:  Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 
494 at 507. 
5
 Mental disabilities is herein taken to include people with mental health problems (now sometimes called 
psychosocial disabilities) and learning disabilities. 
6
 See, eg., United Nations Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of 
Mental Health Care, General Assembly Resolution 46/119 (1991); European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 5(1)(e) and related jurisprudence; Council of Europe 
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takes no such starting point.  Indeed, as will be discussed below, the CRPD appears to proceed on 
the basis that disability cannot be used as a factor in determining whether compulsion may be 
imposed.  For people with mental disabilities, this would be an extraordinary change.  It is not 
merely that some previous international instruments must be taken as superseded.7  It is also that 
the effects on domestic law would be profound.  The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
stated that the CRPD requires the abolition of laws that allow for detention, for the removal of legal 
capacity, or for criminal defences, when those laws rely in whole or in part on mental disability.8  
Insofar as this is correct, it is difficult to see that UK mental health legislation is remotely compliant.  
The terms of the CRPD also raise profound questions about the compliance of UK legislation 
governing mental capacity. 
 
 This paper considers the effect of the CRPD on mental health and mental capacity law.  The 
government appears to take the view that this UK legislation is in fact in compliance with the CRPD.9  
It will become clear from what follows that such a view requires at the very least a much more 
nuanced view than the government provides.  While the issues raised apply equally to all parts of 
the UK, for practical reasons of length the paper focuses on legislation in England and Wales.   
 
 The issues in this paper are not purely academic.  The CRPD is a formal convention, not mere 
guidance, and therefore has the force of international law.  Further, it establishes a supervisory 
body, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disability, to which all state parties are required 
to report every four years on progress towards implementation of the CRPD.  The Committee 
comments publicly on these reports.10  At this time, the Committee has reported on Tunisia and 
Spain, providing a very initial indication of how it will interpret the Convention.11  For countries such 
as the UK that have signed the optional protocol to the CRPD, individuals or groups of individuals 
may complain to the Committee regarding alleged breaches of the CRPD, and the Committee 
adjudicates the matter in a quasi-judicial fashion.  It therefore cannot be assumed that failure to 
comply with the CRPD will pass unnoticed. 
 
An Overview of the CRPD:  Interpreting New Paradigms 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Recommendation of the Council of Ministers R(1999)4 on the Principles concerning the Legal Protection of 
Incapable Adults; Council of Europe Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers Rec(2004)10 concerning 
the Human Rights and Dignity of Persons with Mental Disorder. 
7
 This argument is made most frequently regarding previous UN instruments, most notably the Mental Illness 
principles of 1991:  see, eg., J. Lord, D. Suozzi, A. Taylor, ‘Lessons from the Experience of the U.N. Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance’ 
(2010) Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 564 at 576; A. Dhanda, ‘Constructing a New Human Rights Lexicon:  
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 5 International Journal on Human Rights 43 at 45  
(available on open access at http://www.surjournal.org; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual 
Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) at [48]. 
8
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) at [45], [47], [48].  
These views will be cosidered at length below. 
9
 United Kingdom, Office for Disability Issues, UK Initial Report on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (London:  ODI, 2011). 
10
 See CRPD Art 35. 
11
 For Tunisia, see UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations of the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Tunisia, CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (13 May 2011); for Spain see 
UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Spain, CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (19 October 2011). 
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Scope of the CRPD 
 
 A perusal of the short titles in the CRPD suggests that this is a broadly conventional human 
rights treaty.  Many of the substantive rights protected, including rights to life (Art. 10), equal 
recognition before the law (Art 12), access to justice (Art 13), liberty and security of the person (Art 
14), privacy (Art 22), respect for home and the family (Art 23), education (Art 24), health (Art 25), 
work and employment (art 27), adequate standard of living (art 28), participation in political, public, 
and social life (Arts 29 and 30), along with freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Art 15),  and freedom of movement (art 18), are the daily stuff of human rights law.  Only 
a few of the provisions – the rights to accessibility to the physical environment (Art 9), to personal 
mobility (Art 20) and to rehabilitation (Art 26) being the most obvious – at first glance appear 
directly related to disability.  This conventional human rights orientation is reinforced both by the 
preamble, which catalogues the various human rights treaties from which the CRPD is said to grow, 
and the general principles contained in Article 3, which include autonomy, non-discrimination, and 
similar human rights values. 
 
 At the same time, the CRPD is clearly not a mere repetition of what has come before.  Key to 
the workings of the CRPD are issues of discrimination and reasonable accommodation12 to ensure 
that rights may be enjoyed on an equal basis with others.  The differences that flow from disability 
are thus to be met not with the limitation of the right in question, but with the provision of suitable 
supports so that the right may be enjoyed.  This is reflected in a general requirement to provide 
reasonable accommodation in Article 5(3), but also in the drafting of many of the substantive 
provisions.  The right to freedom of expression (Art 21), for example, is not phrased as a prohibition 
of state interference with expression, but as a positive duty on governments to provide information 
in formats that are appropriate to people with disabilities, to encourage the use of such media in the 
private sector, and to promote the use of sign language. 
 
 Occasionally, however, the language of the CRPD is notably sparse.  The right to integrity 
(Art 17) for example is twenty-three words long, and offers no elaboration on what the right entails.  
The article was fiercely contested in the negotiations leading to the Convention, and at some stages 
in the drafting process was considerably longer, expressly restricting compulsory treatment.  This 
was not acceptable to the disabled people’s organisations present, however, since by restricting 
compulsion in most circumstances, the provision implicitly allowed it in some circumstances.  No 
detailed wording could be agreed, and the current brief wording ended up in the final text. 13   As a 
result, much is left to interpretation, and the ground rules for that interpretation are not necessarily 
obvious.  Does the failure to reach agreement on a new text mean simply that the status quo is left 
in place? In the context of the right to integrity, this could mean that there are only the most basic 
limitations to involuntary treatment in international law, flowing mainly from prohibitions on torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment.  These provisions have in turn been interpreted with 
astonishing deference to the medical profession,14 and would effectively give state parties carte 
                                                          
12
 This is substantially similar to the concept of reasonable ‘adjustments’ in the Equality Act 2010 and, 
previously, the Disability Discrimination Act 1996, but extends to all areas covered by the CRPD. 
13
 On the drafting process regarding Article 17, see A. Lawson, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
Perons with Disabilities:  New Era or False Dawn?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 563 at 608-610; P. 
Weller, ‘The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the social model of health:  new 
perspectives’, *2011+ (Spring) Journal of Mental Health Law 74. 
14
 See, in the context of European jurisprudence, Herczegfalvy v Austria, application no. 10533/83, judgment 
31 August 1992, (1992) 15 EHRR 437 (ECHR).  See also P. Bartlett, ‘”The Necessity must be Convincingly Shown 
to Exist”:  Standards for Compulsory Treatment for Mental Disorder under the Mental Health Act 1983’ (2011) 
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blanche to continue widespread compulsory treatment – an outcome that would certainly not have 
garnered general support in the CRPD negotiations.15  Alternatively, does one use the working 
documents from the negotiations as an aid to interpretation?  This would introduce substance to the 
article that may reflect at least some of the views of participants in the negotiations, and would 
avoid leaving a gaping hole in the Convention, but would enforce an interpretation where the 
negotiators could not reach a consensus.  Neither approach seems unproblematic. 
 
The drafting history of Article 17 highlights a different departure of the CRPD:  the active 
involvement of disabled people’s organisations throughout the negotiation process.  Apart of course 
from participating in formal votes, these organisations were integrated into the negotiation process, 
presenting their own draft articles and commenting directly on the proposals by state participants.  
This ethos of involvement is continued in the procedural requirements of the CRPD, which require 
that disabled person’s organisations be involved in the implementation of the Convention.16   
 
By comparison, traditional professional stakeholders – most notably for this article the 
medical profession – were absent from the negotiations.  This no doubt affected the tenor of the 
negotiations.  It also creates difficulties in implementation of the CRPD, as these stakeholders will be 
confronted with what they are bound to perceive as a fait accompli that will when implemented 
fundamentally alter their conditions of practice. 
 
 The CRPD challenges our understandings and categorisations of rights in new ways.  De 
Burca notes that by implication the CRPD challenges simplistic distinctions between public and 
private action.17  While evidence can be seen in other conventions of this divide being tested, it is 
certainly true that the CRPD expects governments to promote and protect the rights of persons with 
disability in society at large, including requiring private actors to provide reasonable accommodation 
to ensure that rights may be fully enjoyed by people with disability, and making social integration an 
overarching objective of the Convention. 
 
 The CRPD also integrates civil and political with economic, social and cultural rights in new 
ways.18  It is not just that both sets of rights are contained in the same instrument; it is that the very 
division between these categories is challenged.  Article 21 on freedom of expression, noted above, 
serves as a particularly clear example.  Freedom of expression is normally considered a political 
right; but in the CRPD it is articulated in terms of the sorts of services and support that are required 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
19 Medical LR 514; P. Bartlett, ‘Re-Thinking Herczegfalvy:  The ECHR and the Control of Psychiatric Treatment’, 
in E. Brem (ed), Mainstreaming Diversity:  Rewriting Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Cambridge:  CUP, forthcoming 2012). 
15
 Lord et al argue that sparseness of language will allow considerable interpretive scope not merely regarding 
Article 17, but also the rights regarding mental capacity in Article 12, perhaps in both cases undermining the 
progress that had been made controlling the use of compulsion in instruments such as the MI Principles:  see J. 
Lord, D. Suozzi, A. Taylor, ‘Lessons from the Experience of the U.N. Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities:  Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance’ (2010) Journal of Law, Medicine & 
Ethics 564 at 576. 
16
 See Art 33(3). 
17
 G. de Burca, ‘The European Union in the negotiation of the UN Disability Convention’ (2010) 35 European 
Law Review 174 at 175. 
18
  See, in general, G. Quinn, ‘Brining the UN Convention on rights for persons with disabilities to live in 
Ireland’, (2009) 37 British Journal of Learning Disabilities 245 at 247; A. Lawson, ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Perons with Disabilities:  New Era or False Dawn?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law 
& Com 563 at 575;  P. Weller, ‘The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the social model 
of health:  new perspectives’, *2011+ (Spring) Journal of Mental Health Law 74-83. 
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for people with disabilities to take advantage of the right – the provision of information in specific 
formats, for example – that would generally be considered more akin to social and cultural rights.  
This is significant not merely because it challenges a long-established categorical structure, but on a 
much more practical level, because civil and political rights are to be immediately realised, where 
economic, social and cultural rights are subject to progressive realisation.  Consistent with this, the 
CRPD itself includes a specific provision allowing for the progressive realisation of economic, social 
and cultural rights,19 but no such provision for social and political rights.  The difficulty will be to 
determine the application of this provision in a context where the division between civil-political and 
socio-economic-cultural rights is so nebulous.  Continuing with the Article 21 example, are we to say 
that freedom of expression is subject to progressive realisation (an outcome that for cogent reasons 
will be anathema to human rights theorists and advocates); or are we to require poor countries to 
make information intended for the general public to be made available in Braille and other 
accessible formats, taking no account of their financial resources to do so?  Neither choice seems 
particularly appealing. 
 
The Social Model of Disability 
 
 Article 1 of the CRPD contains a partial definition of disability: 
 
Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental, intellectual or 
sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their full and 
effective participation in society on an equal basis with others. 
 
This drafting reflects some of the tensions discussed above.  The inclusion of a definition was in 
doubt up to the penultimate session of the ad hoc committee drafting the Convention, and is the 
result of compromise.20  The chair of the committee proposed that there be no definition, because 
of the risk that groups would be inadvertently excluded, but the disabled people’s organisations 
present wanted a definition to ensure that states could not adopt unduly narrow readings of the 
Convention.  The result is not entirely satisfactory, in that it appears to include only those with long-
term impairments, but the definition is not exhaustive, allowing for further interpretation.  
Significantly for current purposes, the drafting does make it clear that mental disabilities are 
included.  The issues of duration in the definition may affect some mental conditions, but disabilities 
relating to schizophrenia and many types of depression, for example, along with learning disabilities 
are sufficiently long-lasting that the inclusion of people with these disabilities in the CRPD should be 
uncontroversial. 
 
 The reference to barriers to participation emphasises the social model of disability adopted 
by the CRPD.  This may conveniently be juxtaposed to medical and social welfare models.21  Under 
the medical model, the disability is viewed as a medical condition that requires fixing.  As such, it is 
                                                          
19
 See Art 4(2). 
20
 On the drafting history, see A. Lawson, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Perons with 
Disabilities:  New Era or False Dawn?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 563 at 593-595. 
21
 On the move to the social model of disability, see D. MacKay, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 323 at 328; A. Lawson, ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Perons with Disabilities:  New Era or False Dawn?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law 
& Com 563 at 571; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) 
at [35]; A. Dhanda, ‘Constructing a New Human Rights Lexicon:  Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 5 International Journal on Human Rights 43 at 45; R. Kayness, P. French, ‘Out of darkness 
into light?  Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 HRLRev 1 at 5. 
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viewed as contained in the body of the person with disability.  The person with disability is in turn 
perceived as a passive recipient of medical care,22  leading to the marginalisation and objectification 
of that person.  The social welfare model may focus less on people with disabilities as medical 
objects, but still focuses on their limitations.  Under this model, it may be accepted that disability 
may be a long-term condition not amenable to medical treatment, but it is still firmly located in the 
individual, and the social response is to provide care.  In the most extreme cases, this will involve 
institutional care, divorcing the individual entirely from the remainder of society, with decisions 
taken entirely by guardians and similar figures.  Even in less extreme forms, the result is the 
exclusion of people with disabilities in social programmes, rather than their social integration into 
broader society.   
 
 The social model, by comparison, characterises disability in terms of the relationship 
between the individual and society, and in particular the barriers society creates which exclude the 
person with disabilities.  As such, it is not for the individual to be ‘cured’ of his or her disability, much 
less to accept the social exclusion of the social welfare model.  It is instead for society to adapt to the 
needs of people with disabilities so that those people may maximise their participation in society as 
a whole.  As a concrete example, mobility-related disabilities should not be conceived as lying within 
the individual who may use a wheelchair, but in architectural design that does not ensure that 
buildings are accessible to people in wheelchairs. 
 
It is in this vision that the CRPD is taken to have much of its transformative potential:  this is 
a convention that strives to include people in society, and it positively brims with optimism in this 
regard.  A considerable amount of this optimism is entirely justified.  Even in countries such as the 
United Kingdom where discussion of the social model has been current for many years, there is still 
much that can be done, and must be done if people with disabilities are to enjoy rights in the same 
way as the rest of society.  No matter how the implementation of the CRPD in the UK and other 
countries plays out, this fundamental point should not be lost:  things can and must be made 
considerably better. 
 
That said, it is fair to ask whether the social model is, on its own, an adequate model of 
disability.  Kayness and French locate its origins as a critical theory.  In that formulation, it was never 
intended to deny the subjective elements of disability – there was always a space for ‘impairment’, 
to use a word now viewed as stigmatising – but rather to draw attention to the societal responses 
that are amendable to change.  It was never thought to provide a complete model.  In the CRPD, 
they suggest that it has become a ‘disability rights manifesto’, tending towards ‘a radical social 
constructionist view of disability’.23  This appears to reflect the readings of the Convention that are 
current.  While impairment is mentioned in the definition in Article 1, this is in the context of 
interactions with barriers that hinder social participation.  The focus of the literature both from 
within the UN and the academic community has focussed on the social barriers, and this is reflected 
in the remainder of the convention:  the substantive articles are about how society can make rights 
real for people with disabilities.   
 
Whatever the merits of that approach – and there are many – there are also problems that 
result.  The differences experienced by people with disabilities are real.  While the disabled person’s 
                                                          
22
 See, eg., M Oliver, ‘A sociology of disability or a disablist sociology?’ in L Barton (ed), Disability and Society 
(Harlow:  Longman, 1996). 
23
 R. Kayness, P. French, ‘Out of darkness into light?  Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 8 HRLRev 1 at 7. 
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organisations negotiating the CRPD would have preferred the less stigmatising term ‘conditions’ to 
the term ‘impairments’ that appeared in the final text, this is an argument more about language 
than substance.  And there will be times when those conditions make a difference that cannot be 
equalised by merely supportive social responses.  The difficulty is enhanced by the fact that state 
and private obligations are not unlimited:  the reasonable accommodation that is required in 
response to apparent discrimination must ‘not impose a disproportionate or undue burden’ (Art 2).  
The CRPD does not address the question of what response is appropriate when supportive social 
interventions do not in practice make rights real for the person with disabilities.  States are put in a 
particularly difficult position when they are under a further duty under the Convention to protect 
the person with disabilities, as in Article 16, which requires states to protect individuals from 
exploitation, violence and abuse.24 Depending on how this article is interpreted, it might be taken to 
provide a role for proactive state action of a sort that the person with disability may sometimes view 
as coercive.  While such an interpretation stands at odds with the ethos against compulsion 
contained in the remainder of the Convention, making it very difficult to know how to advise states 
in situations where non-coercive interventions do not yield the good outcomes envisaged by the 
Convention. 
 
A New Mental Health Law? 
 
 There is much in the CRPD for mental health advocates to be enthusiastic about.  Traditional 
mental health law has focused on rights concerning detention and compulsory treatment;25 the 
CRPD opens mental disability law to a wide variety of new fields involving social inclusion, including 
rights relating to employment, housing, community inclusion, and education.26  This refocusing can 
only be to the advantage of people with mental disabilities, who in general no longer spend long 
periods of time in psychiatric facilities in the United Kingdom.  As such, the refocusing of lawyers and 
legal academics towards their community rights is long overdue.  The UK is further in a strong 
position to respond to these challenges.  The Equality Act 2010, building on the Disability 
Discrimination Act 1996, includes many of the key concepts required by the CRPD.  There is of course 
much to be done by way of implementation.  Unemployment rates of people with mental disabilities 
remain stratospheric, and decent social housing is scarce and becoming scarcer.27  While there have 
long been formal requirements to make reasonable adjustments to conditions of employment to 
take into account the needs of persons with mental disabilities, academic and jurisprudential 
                                                          
24
 Art 16(1).  For a discussion of these competing values in the context of decisions relating to consent to 
sexual activity, see S. Doyle, ‘The Notion of Consent to Sexual Activity for Persons with Mental Disabilities’ 
(2010) 31 Liverpool Law Review 111.   
25
 See the standard texts in the field, e.g., P. Bartlett and R. Sandland, Mental Health Law:  Policy and Practice, 
3
rd
 ed. (Oxford:  OUP, 2007); B. Hale, Mental Health Law, 5
th
 ed (London:  Sweet and Maxwell, 2010); P. 
Fennell, Mental Health Law and Practice, 2
nd
 ed. (Bristol:  Jordans, 2011). 
26
 The right to education in Article 24 includes the right to be educated in the general education system, in 
schools located in their community.  Sadly, the UK Government issued a reservations on both these aspects of 
the right, so that special schools can remain in the United Kingdom, and students with disabilities may be sent 
to them even if they are not in the local community. 
27
 Regarding employment, see United Kingdom, National Mental Health Development Unit, Work, Recovery 
and Inclusion (London: NMHDU, 2009).  According to this source, only 13.5 per cent of people with a mental 
illness, and 3.% per cent of people receiving secondary mental health services, are employed for 16 hours per 
week or more, compared 72.5 per cent of the population as a whole:  figure 2.  Regarding homelessness, see 
Homeless Link, Survey of Needs Provision 2011 (London:  Homeless Link, 2011); S. Rees, ‘Mental Ill Health in 
the Adult Single Homeless Population:  A Review of the Literature (London:  Crisis/PHRU, 2009). 
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analysis of what is actually required remains scant.28  For persons with mental disabilities, this is a 
particularly complex issue, since each will experience his or her disability slightly differently, and will 
therefore have different needs that are required for reasonable adjustment to occur:  there is 
nothing for people with mental disabilities that corresponds to installing a wheelchair ramp for 
people with mobility-related disabilities, where one response will benefit a significant number of 
people.  So while there remains much to do, there is the makings of a good framework in which to 
do it. 
 
 The realms of traditional mental health and mental capacity law pose quite different 
problems.  In these areas, the paradigms and presuppositions of the law do not chime as readily with 
the social model of disability and the focus on support rather than compulsion that is the basis of the 
CRPD.  It is to these traditional bodies of mental health law that this paper now turns. 
 
Mental Capacity 
 
 Issues relating to mental capacity are dealt with in Article 12 of the CRPD.  Article 12 was an 
extremely contentious article in the negotiations.29  Some understanding of the international context 
is helpful in understanding the debates.  In much of the world, there can be little doubt that the use 
of incapacity law remains oppressive.  People with mental health problems are often found to lack 
capacity on the flimsiest of evidence, sometimes without notice that the proceedings are occurring.  
Partial guardianship, where it exists in all in law, is often not used, so that the incapacity 
determination results in the removal of all the individual’s rights and decision-making authority.  
They may, for example, be legally forbidden from being employed.  Often, they will be placed in 
institutional care, sometimes for life, where their guardian may well be the director of the 
institution.30  
 
Given this background, it is unsurprising that the CRPD includes fundamental alterations to 
laws relating to mental capacity.  The intrusiveness of guardianship law on the individual’s life means 
that implementation of Article 12 has been identified as a particular priority by the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.31Consistent with the social model of disability adopted in the CRPD 
as a whole, the focus is on provision of support, so that people with disabilities can make their own 
decisions.  The issues under the Convention text can be divided into three related questions – 
 
1. To what extent can incapacity as a concept still be used at all? 
 
2. Can decisions ever by made by an individual on behalf of a person with disabilities, and if so 
on what criteria? 
 
3. Insofar as the exercise of legal capacity may be limited, what safeguards are required? 
 
                                                          
28
 On reasonable adjustments/accommodation, see A. Lawson.  ‘People with Psychosocial Impairments or 
Conditions, Reasonable Accommodation and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, in 
McSherry (ed), International Trends in Mental Health Laws, (Sydney:  Federation Press, 2008) 62. 
29
 For discussion of the negotiations, see A Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention:  
Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 429. 
30
 Regarding issues of capacity and guardianship, see the reports of the Mental Disability Advocacy Center on 
Serbia, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, available at http://www.mdac.info.  See 
also Shtukaturov v Russia application no. 44009/05, 27 June 2008 (ECtHR). 
31
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009), [43-45]. 
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All of these are open questions in the analysis of the CRPD.  Canada, the Netherlands, and a number 
of Arab states issued reservations to the convention to ensure that systems of substitute decision-
making could remain for people lacking capacity, suggesting that these countries took seriously the 
notion that the CRPD would require fundamental change in the approach to capacity law.32  The 
United Kingdom made no such reservation. 
 
To what extent can incapacity as a concept still be used at all? 
 
 This question will come as a surprise to many UK mental health advocates, since in this 
country we have for a number of years seen a move to greater reliance on capacity as progressive, 
precisely because it is perceived as non-discriminatory and relatively non-oppressive.33  For reasons 
that will be clear given the international context noted above, this is not the starting point of the 
CRPD.   
 
Article 12(2) provides that people with disabilities may enjoy legal capacity ‘on an equal 
basis with others in all aspects of life’.  The High Commissioner for Human Rights interprets this as 
meaning ‘*w+hether the existence of a disability is a direct or indirect ground for a declaration of 
legal incapacity, legislation of this kind conflicts with the recognition of legal capacity of persons with 
disabilities enshrined in article 12, paragraph 2.’34 
 
On the face of Article 12(2), and consistent with the High Commissioner’s reading, it may be 
possible to continue to use incapacity as a concept, so long as it is sufficiently divorced from 
disability.  This would require significant alterations to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (hereinafter 
‘MCA’), however.  That Act defines incapacity as inability to make a decision ‘because of an 
impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain.’35  This approach is directly 
related to the presence of a disability.  Indeed, this disability threshold was intended as ‘diagnostic’, 
placing the approach within the medical model of disability.36  For compliance with the High 
Commissioner’s reading of Article 12(2) and if a move is to be made away from the medical model of 
disability, this approach would have to be abandoned. 
 
Abandonment of this statutory test would not necessarily pose insurmountable problems.  
The diagnostic threshold has always had its critics, based on its stigmatising potential.37  The 
                                                          
32
 For an interpretation that the CRPD sets no bounds to legal capacity, see T. Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric 
Interventions’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 405 at 411. 
33
 See, eg., J. Dawson and G. Szmukler, ‘Fusion of mental health and incapacity legislation’, (2006) 188 British 
Medical Journal 504, N. Rees, ‘The Fusion Proposal:  A Next Step?’, in B. McSherry and P. Weller (eds), 
Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford:  Hart, 2010), and the papers in the J. Horne and G. 
Richardon (eds), A Model law fusing incapacity and mental health legislation – is it viable; is it advisable?, being 
a special issue 20 Journal of Mental Health Law (2010).  A significantly enhanced role for capacity was 
proposed by the Richardson Committee on reform of the Mental Health Act 1983:  United Kingdom, 
Department of Health, ‘Review of the Mental Health Act 1983:  Report of the Expert Committee’ Chair:  G. 
Richardson.  (London:  DOH, 1999).  This enhanced role was ultimately rejected by the Government. 
34
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) [45]. 
35
 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 2(2). 
36
 See United Kingdom, Law Commission, Mental Capacity (LawCom 231) (London:  Queen’s Printer, 1995) 
[3.8] and United Kingdom, Department of Health, Explanatory Notes to the Mental Capacity Act (London:  
Queen’s Printer, 2005) *22+. 
37
 See, eg., D. Carson, ‘Disabling Progress:  The Law Commission's Proposals on Mentally Incapacitated Adults' 
Decision-making’, (1993) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 304. 
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Department of Health has been giving the provision a broad reading to include conditions such as 
drunkenness,38 even though this was almost certainly not the intent of the legislature.39  Further, if 
the MCA is read literally, incapacity caused by the effects of medications would be outside the scope 
of the MCA, and presumably still covered by common law. Distinguishing between effects of 
medications and effects of impairments in the causation of incapacity seems impractical to the point 
of fanciful, particularly in cases where both might be expected to have significant causal roles.  It is 
difficult to see this as sensible, and abolition of the express connection with a medicalised concept of 
disability might be desirable for reasons even outside the CRPD requirements. 
 
It is less clear whether this solves the discrimination problem that appears to be of concern 
in the High Commissioner’s opinion.  If the test of incapacity still refers to inability to understand 
relevant information, to retain it, to weigh the information as part of a process of decision-making 
and to communicate it – the remaining core criteria under the current MCA40 – it seems inescapable 
that the mental disabilities of some people will be relevant as to whether they meet these criteria.  
In the interpretation of the High Commissioner, this would appear to be impermissible.  If there is a 
problem of discrimination in mental capacity law, the fact that the statute is neutral on its face will 
not address it if a prohibited criterion – disability, in this case – is still relevant to the decision taken.  
Express discrimination has merely become implied discrimination.  Even if the decision-maker does 
not consider disability explicitly (as when, for example, he or she considers ‘ability to make a 
decision’ rather than psychosis, diagnosis, or limited intellectual ability) this will not address the 
problem if the criteria differently affect disabled people – it merely moves the problem from direct 
to indirect discrimination.   
 
Is the use of capacity or a similar concept necessarily discriminatory?  The fact that it is used 
inappropriately in large parts of the world – perhaps including England and Wales41 - does not 
necessarily mean all its uses are discriminatory.  Kayness and French note that a failure to 
acknowledge real difference leads to merely superficial equality, and are particularly critical of 
Article 12 ‘which border*s+ on a complete denial of the instrumental limitations associated with 
cognitive impairments.’42  Certainly, it does seem that the mental condition of the individual may in 
some circumstances be relevant to the appropriate social response to that individual’s care:  the 
individual in the coma is but a particularly clear case of a wider range of situations where the 
person’s mental situation will, it would seem, be unavoidably relevant.   
 
The scholarly debate on Article 12 views these questions not in terms of a debate about the 
use of capacity as a concept, but instead as matters relating to the nature of support offered to 
individuals in making decisions.  It is to these questions that this paper now turns. 
 
                                                          
38
 United Kingdom, Department of Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice (London:  
TSO, 2005), at eg., [4.9] and [4.12]. 
39
 See the differential treatment by the MCA of mental incapacity and drunkenness in its amendment of s 3(2) 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979:  MCA sch 6, para 24.  This removes the jurisdiction of the Sale of Goods Act over 
decisions made by people lacking capacity to contract, but leaves it in place for people who are drunk.  This 
would make no sense if incapacity caused by drunkenness were meant to be within the scope of the MCA. 
40
 See s 3(1). 
41
 As there is no requirement under the MCA to notify anyone when decisions are made on behalf of persons 
lacking capacity, it is not really possible to know how the Act is being implemented. 
42
 R. Kayness, P. French, ‘Out of darkness into light?  Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 8 HRLRev 1 at 7. 
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Can decisions ever by made by an individual on behalf of a person with disabilities, and if so on what 
criteria?43 
 
 Consistent with the overall ethos of the CRPD, Article 12 emphasises the social involvement 
of people with disabilities.  Article 12 is not merely about the right to have a legal status, it is about 
actually being able to make decisions.  This is evident on the face of the text, which as Mégret points 
out refers to legal ‘capacity’, not merely legal ‘personality’ as is contained for example in the ICCPR.44 
It is also clear from the drafting history, where there was considerable dispute as to whether ‘legal 
capacity’ meant the capacity to have rights or the capacity to exercise rights.  The latter seems to 
have been accepted in the negotiations, resulting in some of the national reservations noted above.  
Further, Article 12(2) provides a right to ‘enjoy’ legal capacity, suggesting the latter interpretation, 
albeit with some ambiguities remaining in Article 12(4), which refers expressly to the possibility that 
the exercise of legal capacity may be curtailed in some circumstances.45   
 
The enjoyment of legal capacity is to be accomplished through the use of appropriate 
supports provided to the person with disabilities, so that the individual is never formally deprived of 
legal capacity, but may rely ever more or less heavily on supports to decision-making, as their 
circumstances require.46  In this way, the argument goes, the individual never loses their autonomy, 
the problems associated with the current laws relating to capacity can be avoided, and the needs of 
people with disabilities can be appropriately taken into account.  In the words of Bach and Kerzner,  
‘The language of Article 12 represents a shift from the traditional dualistic model of *mental+ 
                                                          
43
 Before proceeding, a linguistic shift should be recognised.  Traditionally, incapacity law has drawn a 
dichotomy between best interests decision-making, where an individual makes a decision on behalf of a 
person lacking capacity according to the objective best interests of that individual whether or not it is what 
that individual would have chosen, and substitute decision-making, where the decision-maker endeavours to 
reach the decision that the incapable individual would have made if he or she were capable.  The language in 
the academic literature surrounding the CRPD is rather different.  ‘Substitute’ decision-making is taken to 
mean decision-making by someone other than the person with disability.  It would seem generally to be based 
on an objective best interests of the individual rather than what that individual would have chosen, and is thus 
similar to the ‘best interests’ approach in the old language.  It is generally viewed as anathema to the Article 12 
approach.  ‘Supported’ decision-making means helping the individual reach his or her own decision, even when 
the required support is considerable.  It does not appear that there is a category in the CRPD literature for an 
individual making a decision on behalf of the disabled person, but endeavouring to reach the decision he or 
she would have made – the old ‘substitute’ approach. 
44
 F. Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention:  Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?’ 
(2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 494 at 511. 
45
 Regarding the debate in the drafting history on this point, see A. Lawson, ‘The United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Perons with Disabilities:  New Era or False Dawn?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 563 at 
596; A. Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention:  Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for 
the Future?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 429 at 453-454; A. Kanter, ‘The Promise and Challenge of 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & 
Com 289 at 301. 
46
 On these issues, see J. Lord, D. Suozzi, A. Taylor, ‘Lessons from the Experience of the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Addressing the Democratic Deficit in Global Health Governance’ (2010) 
Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 564 at 573, A. Dhanda, ‘Constructing a New Human Rights Lexicon:  
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 5 International Journal on Human Rights 43 at 47 
(available on open access at http://www.surjournal.org); A Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights 
Convention:  Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar for the Future?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 429 
at 441; T. Minkowitz, ‘Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’, in B. McSherry and P. Weller (eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford:  
Hart, 2010) at 156-8. 
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capacity versus [mental] incapacity and is viewed as an equality-based approach to legal capacity.’47  
However intensive the supports may be, they are always directed to the realisation of the will of the 
person with disability.  Article 12 stops short of prohibiting any interference with the exercise of 
legal capacity, instead requiring that such interferences be tailored to the individual’s circumstances, 
for the shortest time possible, subject to safeguards, and ‘respect the rights, will and preferences of 
the person’.48 
 
 Some of this approach fits closely with the MCA.  The MCA for example requires that all 
reasonable steps to help the individual to reach a decision be taken before the Act’s more intrusive 
provisions take effect.49  While this appears similar to a supported decision-making system, there is 
no published research on how, if at all, this provision is being implemented.  Provisions of the MCA 
are designed to ensure that intervention occurs only on specific decisions where the individual is 
unable to make a decision (defined in the statute in terms of incapacity), tailoring intervention to the 
individual’s specific needs and situation.  The MCA further requires that the decision reached on 
behalf of a person lacking capacity must take into account the individual’s past and present wishes 
and feelings, the beliefs and values he or she would have brought to the decision if competent, and 
any other factors he or she would have been likely to consider, if able to do so.50  The object, here 
and elsewhere in the Act, is to keep the individual as involved as possible in the decisions affecting 
him or her.  All this suggests a considerable degree of overlap with the CRPD approach. 
 
 There are complications however.  The above list of decision-making criteria is not 
exhaustive:  the decision-maker must take into account all circumstances relevant to the decision,51 
not merely the subjective factors noted above.  Objective assessments of best interests often figure 
large in the jurisprudence under the statute.  The significance of this objective test in practice is not 
entirely obvious.  It seems likely that most people would, in fact, consider what is in their objective 
best interests as a significant factor in decision-making; but the express inclusion of factors 
unrelated to the views and preferences of the individual is at marked contrast with the approach of 
the CRPD.  The CRPD approach may allow other factors to be considered when the will or 
preferences of the person with disability cannot in practice be ascertained,52 but these will be in only 
rare cases, and much less frequently than envisaged by the MCA.  If the ethos of Article 12 is to be 
implemented, it would seem that legislative amendment will be required in this respect.  
 
This has knock-on effects regarding the role of the person making the decision in the MCA 
on behalf of the person with disability.  Under the MCA, this person actually makes the decision:  it is 
not a case of supported decision-making, but rather decision-making made on behalf of the person 
with disabilities.  A move to the more subjective criteria envisaged by Article 12 makes the person 
                                                          
47
 M. Bach and L. Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, (Toronto:  
Law Commission of Ontario, 2010) at 30.  Parentheses in original.  Available online at www.lco-
cdo.org/disabilities/bach-kerzner.pdf.  Bach and Kerzner’s work is the most extended and considered attempt 
to date to devise a pragmatic programme of implementation for Article 12.  Sadly, space does not permit an 
extended discussion of it here. 
48
 Art 12(4). 
49
 See s 1(3). 
50
 s 4(6). 
51
 s 4(2). 
52
 See T. Minkowitz, ‘Abolishing Mental Health Laws to Comply with the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’, in B. McSherry and P. Weller (eds), Rethinking Rights-Based Mental Health Laws (Oxford:  
Hart, 2010) at 157-8; M. Bach and L. Kerzner, A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal 
Capacity, (Toronto:  Law Commission of Ontario, 2010) at 91-95. 
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much more an agent for the person with disabilities.  This again would be a significant epistemic shift 
in the interpretation of the MCA. 
 
The big issue that is largely unexamined in the CRPD itself is how the shift to a pure 
supported decision-making structure will work in practice.  Certainly, there are some partial models 
that exist, such as representation agreements in British Columbia53 and a mentoring system used in 
parts of Sweden,54 but these have tended to be used in specific contexts, or alongside more 
conventional guardianship legislation.55  Will the sort of system required by the CRPD, in practice, 
solve the problems inherent in a capacity-based framework?  For some individuals, the intensity of 
support that will be necessary is likely to be such as to raise fundamental questions, such as whether 
the decision is the will of the person with disabilities or the supporter, whether the person with 
disabilities is empowered any more than under a well-developed capacity-based system, and how 
one is theoretically to understand the roles of supporter and supported in this system, and how to 
practically provide appropriate protections in the event that the supporter is taking advantage.  That 
said, these difficulties all exist equally in capacity-based systems; would a movement from capacity 
make them any worse? 
 
 While the CRPD expressly allows limitations to the exercise of legal capacity, subject to the 
limitations noted above, it is silent on when those limitations can or should take effect.  If incapacity 
is able to be separated from disability, it could perhaps still be used; but as discussed above, it is 
difficult to see how this is practical.  This would appear to be an awkward silence at the core of 
Article 12. 
 
Insofar as the exercise of legal capacity may be limited, what safeguards are required? 
 
 The safeguards required when exercise of legal capacity is limited are articulated by Article 
12(4): 
 
States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity 
provide for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with 
international human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of 
conflict of interest and undue influence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s 
circumstances, apply for the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a 
competent, independent and impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be 
proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the person’s rights and interests. 
 
In some aspects, the MCA goes a considerable distance towards compliance with these 
requirements.  Interventions are determined according to the specific decisions that an individual is 
unable to make, tailoring the interventions to the individual’s circumstances, and at least in theory, 
making them as minimally intrusive as possible in the individual’s life.  While both the criteria for 
intervention (incapacity as it relates to the decision) and the criteria for making decisions (which 
                                                          
53
 See Representation Agreement Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c 405. 
54
 This is discussed in A Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention:  Stranglehold of the Past or 
Lodestar for the Future?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 429 at 434-435. 
55
 For a detailed proposal on a CRPD-compliant system, see M. Bach and L. Kerzner, A New Paradigm for 
Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, (Toronto:  Law Commission of Ontario, 2010).  Space 
does not permit a detailed discussion of it here,   Whatever its considerable intellectual merits, as yet, their 
proposed system has nowhere been put into effect. 
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include an objective best interest criterion) are problematic, at least the MCA limits the range of 
interventions reasonably narrowly. 
  
 As to procedural safeguards however, the MCA is manifestly lacking.  Most decisions under 
the Act are made pursuant to the general power to make decisions in the best interests of persons 
lacking capacity.56  For these decisions, there are no routine checks to see how decisions are being 
taken under the Act; indeed, there is no requirement to notify anyone when decisions are taken in 
reliance on the Act, nor when an individual is considered as lacking capacity to make a decision.  It is 
therefore difficult to have any systematic sense as to how the Act is being implemented, or whether 
its criteria are being followed at all.  The MCA contains no prohibitions of conflicts of interest 
between decision-makers and people with disabilities.  Certainly, the Court of Protection now exists 
as a specialised court dealing with issues under the MCA, but it considers only the matters that are 
brought before it.  This means it considers mainly cases where disputes have arisen between carers, 
cases where legal certainty is required (as for significant financial transactions), and cases where a 
decision-maker is in significant doubt as to how to proceed.  It is far from obvious that this will 
include all cases where the system is abused.   
 
 While the provisions of the Article 12(4) are manifestly desirable, it is not obvious how they 
are to be implemented in a system such as that of the MCA, which is designed to allow a multiplicity 
of specific decisions rather than wholesale deprivations of rights.  While it is easy to say that the 
MCA does not comply in its procedural safeguards with the provisions of Article 12(4), it is much 
more difficult to say what processes would be appropriate, that would not force the system to 
collapse under its own administrative weight.  Here, as elsewhere, the CRPD poses profound 
practical problems. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The government’s approach to Article 12 has been to say that the MCA and comparable 
Scots and Northern Irish legislation are compatible, since decisions are only taken when individuals 
lack capacity and safeguards are in place to protect the individual in how such decisions are made.57  
No consideration is offered to whether the capacity/incapacity divide and the criteria for decision-
making are consistent with Article 12, and the discussion of safeguards, at least in an English context 
is unconvincing.   
 
 At the same time, Article 12 leaves a variety of questions hanging.  Does it effectively 
preclude any use of capacity as a concept, based on what would seem to be an inevitably close 
relationship with the condition of the disabled person in how it is assessed?  If Article 12 requires us 
to move away from a dualist approach where the divide between capacity and incapacity is no 
longer absolute to a system based entirely on supported decision-making, how is a new system to 
function?   
 
Addressing issues related to capacity is essential in considering the implementation of the 
CRPD as a whole, since capacity is so pivotal to the relationship of mental disability to other aspects 
                                                          
56
 MCA, s 5-6. 
57
 United Kingdom, Office for Disability Issues, UK Initial Report on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (London:  ODI, 2011) at [102-117].  This line of argument is particularly inadequate in the case 
of Northern Ireland, where it would seem that there is currently no legislation covering personal decision-
making by people lacking capacity, although law reform in this regard is in the works. 
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of law.  Capacitous consent is the standard legal requirement prior to the provision of medical 
treatment, for example, and key aspects of criminal law such as the defence of insanity and the 
determination of fitness to plead are based on concepts akin to capacity.  The issues in this section 
therefore will recur in the remainder of this paper, where discussions of the scope of permissible 
compulsion will resonate with the discussions of capacity above. 
 
Compulsory Medical Treatment 
 
 The academic literature tends to view issues of involuntary treatment in the context of the 
right to integrity in Article 17.  As noted above, the phrasing of this article is new in international 
law.  While many human rights provisions seem at least implicitly bound up with the concept of 
integrity, this is the first international treaty to include it expressly as a specific right.  In its final 
formulation, it is a short provision: 
 
Every person with disabilities has a right to respect for his or her physical and mental 
integrity on an equal basis with others. 
 
Although as it stands the article makes no mention of enforced treatment, it is perceived in the 
academic literature as being the primary article concerning involuntary treatment.  This can be 
explained by its drafting history.  At one point, the draft article continued: 
 
2.  States Parties shall protect persons with disabilities from forced intervention or forced 
institutionalisation aimed at correcting, improving or alleviating any actual or perceived 
impairment. 
 
3.  In cases of medical emergency or issues of risk to public health involving involuntary 
interventions, persons with disabilities shall be treated on an equal basis with others. 
 
4.  States Parties shall ensure that involuntary treatment of persons with disabilities is: 
 
(a) Minimised through the active promotion of alternatives; 
 
(b) Undertaken only in exceptional circumstances, in accordance with procedures 
established by law and with the application of appropriate legal safeguards; 
 
(c) Undertaken in the least restrictive setting possible, and that the best interests of 
the person concerned are fully taken into account; 
 
(d) Appropriate for the person and provided without financial cost to the individual 
receiving the treatment or to his or her family.58 
 
These clauses, and paragraph 4 in particular, were hotly contested.  Disabled people’s organisations 
objected that the inclusion of paragraph 4 expressly permitted compulsion of people with disabilities 
in situations where non-disabled people would not be compelled – a clear violation of the non-
discrimination principle.  States party were reluctant to allow the removal of the paragraph, as they 
wished to retain their power to treat without consent people with mental disabilities who had 
capacity to consent to treatment and refused treatment, but were nonetheless a risk to themselves 
                                                          
58
 Ad Hoc Committee, Report of the Seventh Session, A/AC.265/2006/2 (13 Feb 2006). 
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or to other people.59  The eventual compromise was a removal of paragraphs 2 to 4 entirely, leaving 
the bare right to integrity. 
 
 This peculiar drafting history makes interpretation of the provision uncertain.  One reading is 
that it accomplishes virtually nothing.  In the words of Kayness and French, ‘[t]he result is that one of 
the most critical areas of human rights violation for persons with disability – the use of coercive 
State power for the purpose of ‘treatment’ – remains without any specific regulation.’60  At the same 
time, while the scope of the article may be open to interpretation, it is a new provision, not reflected 
expressly in other international law, and it does presumably mean something.  The question is what?  
So far, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has found non-consensual physical 
treatment to violate this article (surgery in the case of Tunisia, sterilisation in the case of Spain).61  It 
has registered concern about the provision of non-consensual psychiatric treatment, but has 
stopped short so far of finding a violation.62 
 
Weller has used a report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture as an aid in interpreting 
Article 17. 63  In this view, the article is engaged by concerns including conditions of detention, use of 
restraints (both physical and chemical), seclusion, experimental treatment, enforced treatment 
(particularly when intended to alleviate disability-related impairments, and specifically including 
psychiatric drugs and electro-convulsive therapy), and particularly intrusive treatments such as 
lobotomy, sterilization, and ‘unmodified’64 electro-convulsive therapy.  The difficulty with this 
approach is that the Special Rapporteur, quite properly, is considering the meanings of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment.  Those rights are protected separately under the CRPD, in Article 
15.65  The right to integrity in Article 17 must mean something different.   
 
                                                          
59
 On the drafting history, see A. Lawson, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Perons with 
Disabilities:  New Era or False Dawn?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 563 at 609; R. Kayness, P. French, 
‘Out of darkness into light?  Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 
HRLRev 1 at 30. 
60
 R. Kayness, P. French, ‘Out of darkness into light?  Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2008) 8 HRLRev 1 at 30. 
61
 UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Tunisia, CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (13 May 2011) at [29]; UN, Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities:  Spain, CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (19 October 2011) at [37-38]. 
62
 UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Tunisia, CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (13 May 2011) at [30] 
63
 P. Weller, ‘The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the social model of health:  new 
perspectives’, *2011+ (Spring) Journal of Mental Health Law 74 at 81-82.  Weller refers to the Interim report of 
the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, General 
Assembly A/63/175 (28 July 2008). 
64
 That is, electro-convulsive therapy provided without the use of anaesthetics and muscle relaxants.  
Unmodified ECT is not practiced in the United Kingdom. 
65
 For an interpretation of Article 15 of the CRPD, including consideration of the Special Rapporteur’s report, 
see T. Minkowitz, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Right to be 
Free from Nonconsensual Psychiatric Interventions’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 405 at 413-426.  
While the report does raise matters of concern in the UK context (eg., the continued availablility of non-
therapeutic sterilisation of people with mental disabilities, albeit following a court order), it generally couches 
its language in terms of areas where violations may occur depending on the circumstances, rather than areas 
where violations are clear.  The application of the report in a UK context is therefore a significantly larger 
debate than can be accommodated in this paper. 
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Quite how Article 17 will be given meaning remains to be seen.  The reference in the Article 
to ‘physical and mental’ integrity suggests a holistic attitude to personhood, and of the self.  This in 
turn may suggest a connection with the capacity issues in Article 12, although precisely how that 
connection would be articulated, it is too early to say. 
 
Can it be taken that state action which would not have been consistent with the draft article 
cited above would therefore not be consistent with the article as it appears in the final text?  As the 
objection to the draft article was that it did not go far enough in protecting against compulsion, this 
might be a coherent position; and if it turns out to be correct, English and Welsh law is open to 
considerable challenge.  Of particular concern would be draft sub-paragraphs 17(4)(b) and 17(4)(c), 
where both process and substance are open to challenge.  Under s 63 of the Mental Health Act 1983 
*hereinafter, ‘MHA’+, persons detained in psychiatric hospitals may be given virtually any treatment66 
for their mental disorder for up to three months without their consent.  There are no procedural or 
substantive restrictions on this enforced treatment.  After three months, a second opinion by an 
independent doctor appointed through a statutory scheme is required for compulsory treatment, 
but the statutory criterion for the compulsion is merely that the treatment be ‘appropriate’.67  It is at 
best questionable whether this meets the test of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in the draft Article 
17(4)(b).  These provisions affected almost 46,000 people in 2009; less than 9000 benefitted from 
the second opinion procedure.68  Rather astonishingly, the government makes no reference to these 
MHA provisions in its initial assessment of compliance with the Article 17.69 
 
 While Article 17 is ambiguous in its meaning, Article 25 on the right to health is much less so.  
Much of the article concerns the duty to provide equal access to health care to people with 
disabilities – itself an important point in the UK and across the world.  Article 25(d) however obliges 
States Parties to require health professionals ‘to provide care of the same quality to persons with 
disabilities as to others, including on the basis of free and informed consent…’.  This appears to 
provide an unambiguous steer that the non-discrimination provisions of the CRPD apply to medical 
consent.  The current general rule is that people with capacity can consent to or refuse treatment as 
they please.  The degree to which this standard will be affected by the reading of Article 12, and the 
discussion above in that regard will not be repeated here.  Suffice it here to say that whatever 
resolution is made of those issues, Article 25 makes it clear that consent rights will have to apply 
equally to people with mental disabilities.    
 
Article 25 does provide a further and direct challenge to the MHA treatment provisions, 
which single out treatment of mental disabilities for compulsion, where treatment of other disorders 
is left to the realm of capacity.  Uniquely, competent people with mental disabilities cannot refuse 
treatment for mental disorders.  The Article 17 debates would suggest that States Parties were 
concerned about the cases of people who had capacity to make treatment decisions, but 
                                                          
66
 The most significant exceptions are psychosurgery (which may only be given with consent and a second 
opinion), and electro-convulsive therapy (which may not be given if the patient either offers a competent 
refusal of the treatment, or has made an advanced refusal of the treatment when competent):  see MHA s 57 
and 58A. 
67
 MHA, s 58. 
68
 For an extended discussion of these provisions, see P Bartlett, ‘’The Necessity must be Convincingly Shown 
to Exist’:  Standards for Compulsory Treatment for Mental Disorder under the Mental Health Act 1983, (2011) 
19 Medical Law Review 514. 
69
 United Kingdom, Office for Disability Issues, UK Initial Report on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (London:  ODI, 2011). 
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nonetheless suffered from disorders that made them dangerous to themselves or others.70  Insofar 
as this is the concern of the UK government (and it should be noted that there is no such criterion in 
the current compulsory treatment provisions of part 4 of the MHA, which governs compulsory 
treatment), it might be possible to pass legislation allowing treatment of people without their 
consent if they were affected by a condition that put themselves or others at risk, so long as that 
legislation applied to everyone, not merely to people with mental disabilities.  While that would 
meet the CRPD’s concerns about non-discrimination, it might well prove politically unpalatable as an 
undue infringement on the civil rights of individuals.  That begs the non-discrimination question, 
however:  if it is not justified for society as a whole, why would it be justified for competent people 
with mental disabilities? 
 
Civil Detention 
 
 The right to liberty is dealt with in Article 14 of the CRPD.  Much of this article is 
uncontroversial, protecting people with disabilities from arbitrary detention and requiring that when 
detained, reasonable accommodation must be provided, reflecting their disabilities.  More 
challenging is the second half of Article 14(1)(b), which holds that ‘the existence of a disability shall 
in no case justify a deprivation of liberty’.  As currently interpreted, this does not mean simply that 
disability cannot be the only ground for detention; it means that disability cannot be a factor in 
determining detention at all.  In the words of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
 
Legislation authorizing the institutionalization of persons with disabilities on the grounds of 
their disability without their free and informed consent must be abolished. This must include 
the repeal of provisions authorizing institutionalization of persons with disabilities for their 
care and treatment without their free and informed consent, as well as provisions 
authorizing the preventive detention of persons with disabilities on grounds such as the 
likelihood of them posing a danger to themselves or others, in all cases in which such 
grounds of care, treatment and public security are linked in legislation to an apparent or 
diagnosed mental illness.71 
 
Consistent with this, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has called on both 
Tunisia and Spain to reform their mental health laws, moving from a system of detention based on 
disability.72 
 
 While the High Commissioner states that detention cannot be based on disability, as is the 
form in virtually all domestic mental health legislation including that of the United Kingdom, she was 
at pains to say that this did not necessarily preclude persons with disabilities from being subject to 
preventive detention.  The above quote continues: 
 
This should not be interpreted to say that persons with disabilities cannot be lawfully subject 
to detention for care and treatment or to preventive detention, but that the legal grounds 
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 A. Lawson, ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Perons with Disabilities:  New Era or False 
Dawn?’ (2006-7) 34 Syracuse J Int’l Law & Com 563 at 609. 
71
 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) at [48]. 
72
 UN, Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations of the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities:  Tunisia, CRPD/C/TUN/CO/1 (13 May 2011) at [24-25]; UN, Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities:  Spain, CRPD/C/ESP/CO/1 (19 October 2011) at [35-36]. 
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upon which restriction of liberty is determined must be de-linked from the disability and 
neutrally defined so as to apply to all persons on an equal basis.73 
 
Presumably, this would mean passage of a general law for preventive detention.  If it is 
dangerousness that is of concern, for example, a disability-neutral law could be introduced to detain 
people who are perceived as dangerous, irrespective of disability.  While this might satisfy the 
problems of interpretation of article 14, it is difficult to see that it is a good idea.  It is difficult to see 
that it would be wise in human rights terms to encourage autocratic regimes to introduce laws 
allowing detention of people perceived as dangerous (whether mentally disabled or not), as such a 
law invites political abuse.  At the same time, this re-phrases the question of discrimination that is at 
the core of the CRPD.  If the law is open to abuse if applied to the general population, presumably 
because ‘dangerousness’ is such an unclear category and is so difficult to predict, why would it be 
acceptable to apply it to people with mental disabilities? 
 
The statement of the High Commissioner further suggests that many (most?) of the people 
currently detained could still be detained, so long as the law was phrased in a neutral fashion.  This 
would be at best problematic.  In much of the world, the move to community-based treatment has 
not occurred, and any policy of making rights real for people with disabilities must include the 
removal of these people from hospitals and similar institutions to community-based alternatives.  
The CRPD should be interpreted to achieve this end by both providing a right to live in the 
community (Article 19) 74 and restrictions on institutional detention.  Disability-neutral detention 
legislation does not imply a move to that end, however; it merely changes the justification for 
detention.  For people internationally in institutions who would benefit from community living, this 
result would be cold comfort indeed.  It is fair to expect considerably more from Article 14, but CRPD 
is an international convention and the interpretation that would bring about a good result 
internationally must also apply to the UK. 
 
A disability-neutral preventive detention statute further poses particular problems for 
countries that are signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights.  Article 5 of the ECHR 
prohibits deprivations of liberty except in specific circumstances, including the ‘lawful detention of … 
persons of unsound mind’.75  No other exception in Article 5 could be used to justify a preventive 
detention statute, and for States Parties to the ECHR, the High Commissioner’s generalist approach 
cannot be implemented.  To comply with both Conventions, if the prevailing interpretations are 
correct, it would seem that preventive detention of people with mental disabilities is not legally 
possible.  People with mental disabilities could admit themselves into hospital if they wished to do 
so, but there would be no mechanism to compel them to do so.  This would be a hard sell to 
governments, to medical stakeholders, to many family carers, and to broader society.   Certainly, a 
great deal more can be done by way of engagement with people with mental disabilities on a 
voluntary basis, but the overwhelming social perception at this time is that in hard cases, this may 
not be enough.   If people are actually acting in a fashion dangerous to others, criminal law could 
presumably be invoked to control them; but this will result in a detention in a police cell, gaol or 
prison – not a particularly humane place to detain someone with a mental disability.  It is also fair to 
ask whether in these circumstances it really makes sense to process someone through the criminal 
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 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) at [48]. 
74
 For a discussion of this Article, see C. Parker, L. Clements, ‘The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities:  a new right to independent living?’, *2008+ 4 EHRLR 508.  Somewhat surprisingly, while advocating 
the demise of institutional care particularly when people are able to be cared for in their own homes (see, eg, 
p 521), Parker and Clements make no mention of Article 14. 
75
 Art 5(1)(e). 
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system, giving them a criminal record that will affect their prospects in the community on release:  
potential landlords and employers are not necessarily sympathetic to people with criminal records.  
Is it really the intention of Article 14 to make it harder to for people with mental disabilities to 
integrate into the community upon release, when such community integration is meant to be at the 
heart of the Convention?   
 
It is tempting to read the CRPD as creating an interrelated basket of rights, with article 14 
entering into effect in tandem with the community services required in Article 19 and elsewhere in 
the Convention.  This has its appeal, as it would allow full deinstitutionalisation to remain as a goal, 
and monitor progress towards it.  It would keep the potential for real content to be retained in 
article 14, progressing beyond the previous international law, and keeping in view that the object of 
the convention is the provision of community living for people with mental disabilities.  It would 
place deinstitutionalisation in a hand-in-glove relationship with the development of community 
services, and this makes some practical sense:  the experience of countries where major 
deinstitutionalisation has occurred in the last decades is that closure of institutions without 
provision of appropriate community services can lead to profoundly unfortunate results for people 
with mental disabilities.  There are various difficulties with this approach, however.  First, it makes 
the right to liberty subject to a progressively realisation, a precedent that human rights advocates 
would quite rightly not want to see.  Second, while the monitoring mechanisms of the CRPD do 
mean that progress towards implementation is more visible than for other conventions, it is not 
obvious that they would keep sufficient pressure on States Parties to move towards non-institutional 
solutions.  And finally, it is not the approach adopted by the Committee in its recent reports on Spain 
and Tunisia.  They instead call for non-compulsory mental health law, with no express link to the 
provision of community alternatives. 
 
 While Article 14, like so much of the CRPD, is challenging to interpret and problematic to 
implement, the UK government’s response is singularly disappointing: 
 
Under the 1983 Act [i.e., the MHA], a person with a mental disorder may be detained and 
treated (or be made subject to certain other restrictions) without his or her consent where 
that is justified by the risk that the mental disorder poses to him or her or to other people. 
Safeguards ensure that any such deprivation of liberty is not arbitrary and complies with the 
law (including Article 5 of the ECHR). … Individuals have the right to have their case reviewed 
by an independent and impartial Mental Health Tribunal. They also have the right to receive 
support from statutory Independent Mental Health Advocates.76 
 
The response correctly acknowledges that detention under the MHA is directly related to mental 
disability, but seems to take the view that because safeguards are available to ensure that the 
diagnosis of medical disability and risk are accurate, Article 14 is not infringed.  It is difficult to see 
that this is remotely consistent with the readings of the Article discussed above. 
 
Criminal Law 
 
 Issues of mental disability arise in criminal law primarily in the contexts of fitness to plead, 
the defence of insanity, and the partial defence to murder of diminished responsibility.  These are 
generally related to issues of capacity, in the first case capacity to engage with the processes of trial, 
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 United Kingdom, Office for Disability Issues, UK Initial Report on the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (London:  ODI, 2011) at [134]. 
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and in the second two, whether the individual had the requisite mental elements to be held 
responsible at all, in the case of insanity, or fully responsible, in the case of diminished responsibility. 
The issues therefore are primarily relevant to Article 12.   
 
While the Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has been silent on criminal 
law issues in its two state reports, the High Commissioner for Human Rights has taken the view that 
current legal approaches must be changed: 
 
In the area of criminal law, recognition of the legal capacity of persons with disabilities 
requires abolishing a defence based on the negation of criminal responsibility because of the 
existence of a mental or intellectual disability.  Instead disability-neutral doctrines on the 
subjective element of the crime should be applied, which take into consideration the 
situation of the individual defendant. Procedural accommodations both during the pretrial 
and trial phase of the proceedings might be required in accordance with article 13 of the 
Convention, and implementing norms must be adopted.77 
 
The requirement that criminal law move away from engagement with mental disability is 
counter-intuitive.  Usually, the argument has been that people with mental disabilities are already 
over-represented in criminal law generally and in the prison population in particular,78 in 
circumstances where their real responsibility for the crime at issue is at best questionable.  Insofar 
as a move away from disability-based criminal law will reduce the scope of these defences, this 
problem will be exacerbated.  If this is true in the United Kingdom, the perceived injustice is even 
more pronounced in other countries, where conditions of detention may be profoundly 
substandard, and where fewer legal protections (such as an effective system of legal aid) assist 
people with mental disabilities in the criminal justice system.79  The situation in countries that retain 
capital punishment is even more stark:  if disability-based defences are removed without provision 
of equally extensive alternatives, more people will be executed who are doubtfully responsible for 
the crimes of which they are accused. 
 
That in turn would appear to mean that the development of non-discriminatory alternative 
formulations must be of paramount importance.  The difficulties here mirror those in the discussions 
of capacity and detention, above.  Certainly, one could remove express diagnostic criteria from the 
definitions of relevant defences, but if the claim is that an individual is unable to conduct a defence 
or is not responsible for their actions, it is likely for people with mental disabilities that the reason 
for this will be directly associated with their mental disability.  If the existing law is discriminatory, 
therefore, the amended law will also be discriminatory.  And insofar as the issue becomes focussed 
on developing co-extensive and non-discriminatory versions of existing law, there is a serious risk 
that the actual situation of people in the criminal law system is lost track of.  The argument remains 
compelling that criminal law is already overly controlling of people with mental disabilities, as 
evidenced by the numbers in prisons.  In many countries of the world, their legal position, as well as 
their conditions of detention, are indefensible.  It would be a sorry situation indeed for these 
matters to be marginalised, with all efforts focussed on rewording of legislation.  
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 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Annual Report, A/HRC/10/48 (26 January 2009) at [47]. 
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 It would seem that roughly half of prisoners have primary or secondary mental health needs upon 
admission:  see United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons, ‘The mental health of prisoners’ 
(London:  HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2007) at [1.14]. 
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 See, eg., Mental Disability Advocacy Center (MDAC), ‘Liberty Denied:  Human Rights Violations in Criminal 
Psychiatric Detention Reviews in Hungary’ (Budapest:  MDAC,  2004). 
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The government’s response to the CRPD makes no mention of these aspects of criminal 
law.80  Amendments to the law of diminished responsibility in 2009 have endeavoured to engage 
more closely with the provisions of modern medicine, but there has been no movement away from 
mental disability as the core of the defence.81  Consultation by the Law Commission on amendments 
to the law of fitness to plead are now underway,82 and on amendments to the law of insanity will 
begin soon.  Initial indications are that these, too, will rely directly on mental disabilities.  It is 
therefore difficult to see that these will be consistent with the analysis of the High Commissioner. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 At its inception, the CRPD was greeted with an almost revolutionary joy.  UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan for example referred to ‘the dawn of a new era – an era in which disabled people 
will no longer have to endure the discriminatory practices and attitudes that have been permitted to 
prevail for all too long.’83 And there can be no doubt that the CRPD does make a significant in the 
promotion of human rights for people with disabilities.  Rights to community living and all the 
supportive services and mechanisms required to make community integration a reality have moved 
from semi-official guidance and statements of good practice to the centre of an international 
convention.  Nowhere will these developments be felt more keenly than in mental disability law, 
which must now be taken to be about so much more than the regulation of involuntary admission 
and treatment, and the law relating to people lacking capacity.   
 
 The party celebrating the passage and ratification of the CRPD is now over, however, and on 
the morning after, as we look out (perhaps slightly hung over) on this brave new world that has been 
created, we need to figure out how to live in it, how to make the CRPD actually work in practice.  
That is not just a matter of buttressing the services that will promote social integration (vital though 
that task is); it is also about asking the hard questions that relate to the laws relating to compulsion 
that are based on disability, including those relating to mental capacity, the compulsory treatment 
and detention permitted by mental health legislation, and issues of mental disability in the criminal 
law.   
 
 In assessing the way forward, it will be necessary to take into account several guiding 
principles.  First, the CRPD is an international treaty.  While the solutions we reach need not be 
applicable outside the UK, the interpretation we give to the treaty must be defensible in 
international law.  Second, the fact that we have always done things a certain way is not in itself a 
justification for continuing in that way.  In ratifying the CRPD, the UK signed up to a paradigm shift, 
and implementing that shift does not occur without the challenge to fundamental assumptions 
about how we have acted in the past.  Third, particularly if we wish to move beyond on in a different 
direction to the interpretations of the CRPD that we have received from the High Commissioner and 
the developing interpretations of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, we will 
need to be clear why, based on the wording of the Convention, our readings are justified.  Proper 
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 See amendments to Homicide Act 1957, s 2, introduced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.  Regarding the 
justifications for these changes, see United Kingdom, Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, LC 290 
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and detailed theoretical analysis matters.  Good evidence will also be vital to the way forward, and 
that evidence at the moment is often minimal, and often ignored. 
 
 The implementation of the CRPD raises legitimately difficult questions, and they will not be 
solved easily or quickly.  It is however clear that UK law does not comply with the current 
interpretations of the CRPD in key respects, and the government’s unconvincing avoidance of those 
issues is disappointing and unhelpful.  The UK has a strong and impressive history at the forefront of 
mental health law; it is well-placed to lead on these issues. 
